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INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY1
The liberty of citizens in a democracy has two components—the negative
liberty to be let alone and the positive liberty of self-government.2 Both are
crucially important, yet promotion of one can eclipse the other. If individual
freedom can never be limited, the community is powerless to address
significant social ills like the Great Depression. At the same time, if the power
of self-government knows no bounds, individual freedoms can be lost. The
fact that any democratic government committed to individual rights must
attend to liberty in both of its forms is a familiar idea.
Every society must decide how to organize its economy and how
pervasively to extend market-based principles of distribution and allocation.
Given the role that governments can and do play in establishing the
framework within which economic activity takes place, meaningful
self-government requires that elected officials be able both to set the rules for
the economy and establish its boundaries. Yet, democratic decisions about the
reach of the market can affect a person’s ability to exercise her individual
rights. The positive liberty of self-government must be balanced against the
negative liberty of individuals to do as they choose. This important and
familiar tension has been overlooked in the Supreme Court’s current
campaign finance jurisprudence. While the Court has aggressively protected
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the individual’s interest in spending money to speak, without interference by
the state, the Court has neglected the individual’s interest in deciding, along
with others, that politics ought to be walled off from the market. Instead, the
Supreme Court should safeguard not only individual liberties of speech and
action but also collective liberties of self-government.
I. THE NEGLECTED LIBERTY OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
Individuals possess a positive liberty of self-government and a negative
liberty to be let alone. Inevitably, these two liberties come into conflict. When
the polity restricts what individuals may do, the polity exercises the positive
liberty of self-government at the expense of the individual’s negative liberty
to be let alone. This tension cannot be avoided, only recognized and
thoughtfully balanced. Much of our constitutional law aims to do just this.
At times, it is the negative liberty that is vindicated, for example when
the Supreme Court strikes down laws that restrict the individual right to
possess a handgun in the home or abort an early fetus. Other times, the
positive liberty wins out, for example when the Court upholds laws that set
minimum wages or maximum hours.
According to our fundamental rights doctrine, when the liberty at issue is
fundamental, that liberty most often is protected. Why are some liberties
fundamental and others not? This is a perennial question. Indeed, every first
year student of constitutional law is pressed to explain the difference between
the substantive due process jurisprudence of today and that of the Lochner3
era. A common response is to emphasize that economic liberties are more
likely to receive protection in the political process and thus are less in need
of judicial protection.4 On this account, the economic liberties at stake in the
Lochner era cases do not warrant heightened review because they are less
vulnerable. Although the vulnerability of the liberty is one plausible way to
explain the bifurcation in our constitutional law between its treatment of
economic liberties and so-called “personal” liberties, there is another, possibly
more fruitful, approach. Rather than focusing on the relative vulnerability of
the negative liberty infringed, perhaps we should focus on the significance of
the positive liberty that is exercised.
The regulation of the economy is a central aspect of self-government.
Where such an important dimension of self-government is involved, courts
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 147, 175-76 (1999) (arguing that “there is neither need nor good argument for aggressive
judicial protection” of economic liberties); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 278

(1977) (arguing that laws limiting the liberty of contract are unlikely to “give effect to external
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have a reason to defer to legislative decisions. On this account, the cases of the
Lochner era were properly rejected not because the personal liberties at issue
were unimportant or secure but instead because the liberty of self-government
at stake was so momentous. The thrust of this insight is this: when the polity,
through its representatives, makes decisions that implicate the liberty of
self-government most strongly, those decisions deserve extra deference. What
decisions are these? This will be a difficult line to draw, though no harder than
delineating fundamental from non-fundamental individual rights.
II. TRANSLATING THIS THEORY INTO A LEGAL ARGUMENT
Buckley v. Valeo5 and its progeny neglect the positive liberty of
self-government. Restrictions on spending money to speak and giving money
to candidates in elections do implicate the negative liberty of free speech. But
these restrictions are also especially important exercises of the positive liberty
of self-government. In essence, the aim and effect of campaign finance laws
is to insulate politics from the market to avoid the translation of economic
success into political success.6
Campaign finance laws take different forms but in essence they draw a
boundary around the economic market and restrict its influence. Money buys
many things in our society. What money can buy is sometimes controversial
(e.g., when high-priced lawyering affects judicial outcomes or private
education affects opportunities) and other times not (e.g., when money buys
nice homes and expensive clothes). A polity’s decision about what money can
buy is a central and important aspect of self-government, and similar in kind
to its determinations about the basic structure of the economy. When
Congress or a state legislature determines that the domain of politics should
be walled off from the domain of the economy, this is a decision that deserves
a substantial degree of respect.
Indeed, the current Supreme Court has already acknowledged the polity’s
interest in erecting a barrier between economic power and political power.
The Court permits campaign finance laws that restrict speech when and to
the extent that they prevent corruption.7 While defenders of campaign
finance laws lament the overly narrow conception of corruption that the

5
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7 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”).
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Court accepts,8 even a narrow concern with avoiding the quid pro quo
exchange of money for political acts (what most would call simply bribery)
recognizes the positive liberty of self-government at issue.
The polity has a compelling interest in forbidding bribery of public
officials and candidates for office because laws that restrict the sale of official
acts for money insulate the political sphere from the market sphere, limiting
the ability of wealthy individuals and institutions to translate that wealth into
political outcomes they favor. If the polity cannot wall off politics from the
market, it loses its most precious form of self-government.
By acknowledging that the government can prohibit bribery of public
officials, the Supreme Court has, albeit implicitly, already acknowledged the
interest in self-government that is implicated in campaign finance laws.9 Yet,
the Court has not understood this interest in these terms. As a result, the
Court has failed to recognize and appropriately weigh the important
self-government interest that is also in play in campaign finance cases. When
the Court strikes down a law because it limits freedom of speech, the Court
does not determine how that freedom should be exercised or what it should
be used to say. Similarly, when the Court recognizes the positive liberty of
self-government at issue in a law that criminalizes the bribery of public
officials,10 the Court has reasons to defer to the legislature’s judgment about
how this liberty of self-government is properly used. A key error of the
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, then, is not only that it has defined
corruption too narrowly but that it has been too eager to define it itself.11 The
democratically elected branches of government have a more significant role
to play in this task than the Court has thus far recognized.
The legal argument for recognizing the positive liberty of self-government
at stake in campaign finance laws could take either of two forms. As suggested
above, the Court could treat campaign finance law’s implicit determination of
what constitutes corruption more deferentially on the grounds that these laws
are central exercises of self-government. Alternatively, the Court could
8 See, e.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 2 (2014) (“Corruption, in the American tradition, does not just
include blatant bribes and theft from the public till, but encompasses many situations where
politicians and public institutions serve private interests at the public’s expense.”).
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (concluding that extortion “is completed at
the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific
official acts”); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991) (finding that quid pro quo is
“necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act when an official receives a campaign contribution”).
11 See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1385, 1402 (2013) (criticizing courts for attempting to define corruption because it is a derivative
concept that “depends on a conception of the role of a legislator in a well-functioning democracy”
and emphasizing that, in other areas, the Court is reluctant to define good government).
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recognize that these laws implicate two important liberty interests: the
negative liberty to be free to speak and the positive liberty to insulate the
political domain from the influences of wealth. While the strict scrutiny
framework makes either course somewhat difficult to operationalize—as one
might wonder how such strict scrutiny can be combined with deference or
with recognition of a second fundamental liberty at stake—it is not without
precedent. We find deference combined with strict scrutiny in university
affirmative action cases. For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court both
strictly scrutinizes the university’s use of race in admissions and defers to the
university’s judgment about the need for diversity.12 While Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, casts some doubt
on the degree of deference that is permitted,13 Grutter still provides some basis
for the view that when other constitutional values are in play (the University’s
First Amendment–based right to make educational judgments about how
class composition affects learning), both scrutiny and deference have roles to
play.14 The Court’s abortion case law provides an example of an arena in which
the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of two important rights that
need to be balanced: the woman’s freedom to determine whether to continue
her pregnancy and the state’s interest in the developing fetal life which
becomes increasingly important over the course of the pregnancy.15 Because
of the weight of the state’s interest in developing fetal life, the Court holds
that restrictions on the right of the woman to choose to abort the fetus must
only avoid being unduly burdensome.16 Drawing on this doctrine, one could
say that because the state’s interest in defending its elections from the
influence of wealth relates to a central exercise of self-government,
restrictions on the right to use money to speak will be upheld so long as they
do not unduly burden an individual’s right to engage in political speech.

12 See 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity
is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”).
13 See 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (noting that only “some, but not complete, judicial deference
[to universities] is proper”).
14 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”).
15 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858 (1992) (recognizing a woman’s
liberty interest in continuing the pregnancy and the state’s interest in fetal protection).
16 See id. at 846 (noting a woman’s right “to choose to have an abortion before viability and to
obtain it without undue interference from the State”). While I do not agree with the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence, nonetheless, this doctrine provides an important precedent for the position
that even fundamental rights sometimes must be balanced against other interests of comparable
weight.
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III. CHALLENGING THE ARGUMENT
The assertion that the liberty of self-government is being inappropriately
neglected in the Court’s campaign finance cases gives rise to (at least) two
challenges that must be addressed. First, one might wonder whether the
positive liberty of self-government is plausibly in play in any and every case.
If positive liberty is at play, defenders of laws limiting rights—forbidding gun
ownership or abortion, for example—might also be able to make an argument
analogous to the one I have offered here. Second, if the legislative branches
of government are entitled to deference when exercising their positive liberty
of self-government, will this approach enable current politicians to protect
and entrench their own power? In other words, without judicial oversight,
does this approach amount to the fox guarding the hen house? I address each
of these challenges below.
The first challenge rightly notes that self-government is implicated in any
law that a state or national legislature passes. This is why, of course, court
invalidation of legislative acts is always, at least potentially, controversial. In
elevating this interest in self-government, I do not intend to suggest that the
Court lacks the power of judicial review. Rather, I claim that certain laws
constitute central exercises of self-government and, in such cases, this liberty
interest should be given significant weight. The argument offered here rests
on the claim that structuring the economy and delineating its scope are
central exercises of self-government.17
Second, campaign finance laws not only insulate political power from
economic power, they also establish the rules by which political power is
maintained and transferred. If the elected branches are entitled to deference
in such cases because of the importance of the self-government liberty at
stake, this approach might open the door to extreme incumbency protection
and other distortions of the political process. This is a serious concern. When
laws affect the political process itself, there are special reasons for judicial
oversight.18 While this is correct, the point suggests that courts should
evaluate campaign finance laws to ensure that they do not entrench
incumbents and to make certain the channels of political change are indeed
open. This reason for invalidating such laws is fairly circumscribed and would

17 In this piece, I sketch the argument that laws which constitute central exercise of self-government
deserve more deference than other laws. I cannot also develop the argument that laws regulating the
economy constitute central exercises of self-government. While I think the claim has intuitive
appeal, a full defense would require more discussion than is possible here.
18 As John Hart Ely famously emphasized, courts have a special role to play in “[c]learing the
[c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980).
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thus allow for far more campaign finance regulation than under current
doctrine.
Thus courts do have a role to play. First, they must assess whether the law
at issue is a central exercise of self-government. It is likely that any campaign
finance law will satisfy this criterion as these laws separate the domain of
politics from the domain of the market economy and therefore constitute a
central commitment of a polity. Second, courts must make sure that the law
at issue does not entrench incumbents. Third, laws that restrict contributions
and expenditures implicate both the negative liberty to speak and the positive
liberty to keep politics insulated from wealth. As both aspects of liberty are
involved, courts have a third role to play in balancing the effects on each form
of liberty of the particular law at issue.
CONCLUSION: DISTINCT ADVANTAGES
Laws limiting campaign giving and spending are central exercises in
self-government because they delineate the boundaries of the sphere of
politics and of the economy. One further sphere worth discussing is the press.
It is sometimes suggested that if political equality is treated as another
compelling interest that justifies limits on campaign giving and spending, the
inequality between press-speakers and other speakers will require
justification.19 The self-government rationale for campaign finance laws
avoids this problem. Together, we have a liberty interest in deciding for
ourselves the role that economic power will play in other domains. When we
exercise this power in a particular way, via a campaign finance law, we need
not do so in a manner that is completely consistent as a matter of principle.
Just as the speaker exercising her right of free speech can adopt views that
others find not fully consistent, so too can we, collectively, adopt policies that
are realistic accommodations of several of our values.
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